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Abstract - Dynamic price discrimination adjusts prices based on the option value of future sales, 
which varies with time and units available. This paper surveys the theoretical literature on dynamic 
price discrimination, and confronts the theories with new data from airline pricing behavior, Consider 
a multiple booking class airline-seat inventory control problem that relates to either a single flight leg 
or to multiple flight legs. During the time before the flight, the airline may face the problems of (1) 
what are the suitable prices for the opened booking classes, and (2) when to close those opened 
booking classes. This work deals with these two problems by only using the pricing policy. In this 
paper, a dynamic pricing model is developed in which the demand for tickets is modeled as a 
discrete time stochastic process. An important result of this work is that the strategy for the ticket 
booking policy can be reduced to sets of critical decision periods, which eliminates the need for large 
amounts of data storage.  
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Abstract - Dynamic price discrimination adjusts prices based 
on the option value of future sales, which varies with time and 
units available. This paper surveys the theoretical literature on 
dynamic price discrimination, and confronts the theories with 
new data from airline pricing behavior, Consider a multiple 
booking class airline-seat inventory control problem that 
relates to either a single flight leg or to multiple flight legs. 
During the time before the flight, the airline may face the 
problems of (1) what are the suitable prices for the opened 
booking classes, and (2) when to close those opened booking 
classes. This work deals with these two problems by only 
using the pricing policy. In this paper, a dynamic pricing model 
is developed in which the demand for tickets is modeled as a 
discrete time stochastic process. An important result of this 
work is that the strategy for the ticket booking policy can be 
reduced to sets of critical decision periods, which eliminates 
the need for large amounts of data storage. 
Keywords : Bidding, dynamic pricing, electronic 
markets, group-buying discounts, Internet based selling, 
market microstructure, online retailing, pricing 
mechanism. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
n Dynamic pricing mechanisms where buyers and 
sellers actively engage in the price discovery process. 
Today, traditional dynamic pricing mechanisms serve 
as the core business models for many Internet-based 
electronic markets.  Indicative of its attractiveness to 
consumers in the Internet marketplace, the registered 
users of eBay increased from 1.2 million to 2.1 million 
during the last three months and about $750 Million 
worth transactions were conducted on their website that 
year.  Other new approaches like online trading and 
online auctions are also attracting consumers, however. 
They include dynamic Pricing mechanisms such as the 
name-your-own-price.E-bay is the world‟s largest 
auction site where the buyers and seller are to be 
participating in the auction mechanism-bay is one of the 
most profitable e-business site, in one day 5,00,000 
items may added in the auction site, this strategy can 
work throughout at the end of the day. The initial model 
of c2c auctions entirely managed by the technology, 
buyers can easily buy the products at any time in the 
auction site. Some sites use dynamic pricing in auction 
mechanism and they are like priceline.com this site 
involve   the dynamic   variations   of  the  prices  in  the 
market.    The     other      site     which     is    known    as 
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travelbids.com in which the buyers can bid their money 
for travelling expenses through auction mechanism. 
There are some websites like Priceline.com, 
TravelBids.com and BuyersEdge.com which uses 
dynamic pricing mechanism. Retailer itself, As this 
group-buying discount pricing mechanism is still a new 
phenomenon on the Internet, there have been no 
studies that have examined the performance of this 
market microstructure, and the nature of the bidder 
behaviour that can be observed as the market operates.  
Research on consumer behaviour under the group-
buying market structure can help both academic 
researchers and industrial practitioners better 
understand this new kind of market intermediary, and 
the efficacy of the market mechanism that it provides to 
market participants. 
a) Basics of Auction Mechanism 
The commonly used basic auction mechanisms 
can be classified into the following two main categories 
based on the number of bidding sides: a single auction 
and a double Auction , In a single auction, participants 
can take part only in one side of an auction (i.e., be 
either an auctioneer or a bidder). In a double auction, 
participants are free to take part in both side of an 
auction. Other kinds of auction mechanism are as 
follows. 
Single auction mechanism: This type of auction 
can be divided into an open-outcry auction and a sealed 
bid auction based on bidding methods. In an open-
outcry auction, the bids are open to public and Bidders 
can adjust their bids in the full knowledge of other bids. 
In a sealed bid auction, only a bidder and the auctioneer 
can communicate with each other, and bidder to bidder 
Communication is forbidden. The basic single auction 
sub-types with open-cry bid are English and Dutch 
auctions: English auction:  In an English auction, an 
auctioneer creates an auction market and proceeds to 
solicit in open successively higher bids from the bidders 
until no one raises the bid. The highest bidder is the 
winner and pays the price he/she bid. Dutch auction: An 
auctioneer announces the bids to all bidders. The 
auctioneer starts the bidding at an extremely high price 
and then progressively lowers it until a buyer claims an 
item by calling "mine", or by pressing a button that stops 
an automatic clock. The winner pays the price bid at the 
stop time. 
Double auction mechanism: A double auction 
admits multiple buyers and multiple sellers concurrently 
into the market. Thus, the double auction must match 
bids of the both sides in the market. The double auction 
I 
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can be divided into two main classes based on the 
auction clearing time: Call Market and Continuous 
Double Auction (CDA). In a Call Market, bids are 
collected over a specific time interval from both sellers 
and buyers in a sealed manner. 
b) Extended Types of Auction Mechanism 
Multi-attribute Auction (MA): A Multi-attribute 
Auction allows bidders to bid on various attributes 
beyond the price. In this type of an auction, the 
auctioneer selects winners based on the price as well as 
on those various attributes. Thus, the overall utility of a 
deal for the buyer must consider not only the price of the 
auctioning item, but also a combination of the different 
attributes, Combinatorial Auction (CA):In a 
Combinatorial Auction, each bidder offers a bid for a 
collection of resources (of the bidder's choosing) rather 
than placing a bid on each item separately. This enables 
the bidder to express dependencies and 
complementarities between various resources. The 
auctioneer selects such set of these combinatorial bids 
that result in the highest revenue without assigning any 
item to more than one bidder.  Snadholm showed that 
the number of possible allocations in a combinatorial 
auction is where m is the number of items traded in the 
auction. 
Generalized Vickrey Auction (GVA): Another 
mechanism for determining prices for an allocation of 
multiple units of resources is the Generalized Vickrey 
Auction. In GVA, the price of a bidder k in the efficient 
allocation is computed by deducting the sum of 
payments of all other bidders in an allocation from the 
sum of the payments that would be obtained from those 
bidders in the optimum allocation where the bidder k 
removed from the allocation. 
Finally, enough bidders must be willing to 
participate in future auction roundsto prevent a collapse 
of market prices. Because of these requirements, 
previously designedauctions cannot work efficiently in e-
service markets.A static time differential pricing 
mechanism in which two or more tiers ofon/off peak 
rates are used can improve efficiency by partially 
matching lower (higher) demand with lower (higher) 
price. However, this mechanismstill remains inflexible, 
since demands of buyers do not follow a step function, 
but rather gradually shift from on- to off-peaks and back. 
Dynamic pricing mechanism that adapts tochanging 
market conditions constantly is more efficient. It 
maintains highresource utilization and the seller‟s 
revenue in variety of market conditions. 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In the year 2009, the paper proposed by 
Roumen Vragov, Di Shang, Karl R. Lang, In the paper 
“Auction based E-Procurement Mechanism Design “, 
They sugest that a view of an emerging phenomenon 
The E-procurement [3]. But the drawback of a new 
mechanism is designed based on E-auction 
mechanism; one problem occurred during this paper 
that without internet we are not able to implement the 
auction strategies. 
In the year 2009,the paper proposed by Hila 
Etzion and Scott Moore ,In the paper “Secure keyword 
auction:[4] preserving privacy of bidding prices and 
CTRs”,they suggest that we use a simulation model to 
extend previous analytical research on a firm selling 
consumer goods online using posted price and auction 
at the same time.Three research streams are useful in 
informing our how their expectations about future prices 
develop, and how their attitudes toward risk affect their 
behavior.but the drawback in this paper[16] is Bidder 
and buyer reactions to prices are especially worthwhile 
to consider in the context of group buying discount 
electronic markets. Even though Drakopoulos doesn‟t 
use the term explicitly,[14] he explains the main idea of 
price indifference thresholds, which refer to the 
minimum price changes required for consumers to 
detect the differences. By incorporating a threshold into 
a demand curve, he proposes that when a price change 
is smaller than some critical threshold, consumers will 
not detect the price change, resulting in no change in 
demand. In our research, we will refer to the related 
term, price threshold, to indicate proximity in order 
quantity terms to the quantity-price combination that 
reflects a drop in price to the lower-tier[2]. 
In the year 2009,the paper proposed by Robert 
J. Kauffman, in the paper “New Buyers‟ Arrival under 
Dynamic Pricing Market Microstructure” they suggest 
that Using data collected from MobShop.com, the 
current study tested a model that predicts bidder 
participation and order arrivals in an electronic market 
that uses an innovative group-buying discount market 
microstructure.[4][5]The problem can be occurring as 
some buyer‟s donot use the electronic equipments in 
the market. The variations of a cost can be high, the 
consumer can pay high amount for new features and 
new items can be added. 
In the year 2009, the paper proposed by 
Shamik Sengupta and Mainak Chatterjee, in the paper 
“An Economic Framework for Dynamic Spectrum 
Access and Service Pricing” they suggest that Dynamic 
spectrum allocation coupled with fine granularity 
switching of services by end-users will engender a 
flexible and competitive environment for trading wireless 
services.[6][8] The drawback of this paper to implement 
the radio signals and their dynamic mechanism.In the 
year 2010,the paper proposed by Wei-Yu Lin, Guan-Yu 
Lin, Hung-Yu Wei, In the paper “Dynamic Auction 
Mechanism for resource allocation” they suggest The 
main contribution of this paper is developing a new 
resource allocation algorithm by applying auction 
method into the resource allocation, but one problem 
occurred while in the allocation of resources in the 
market, it is not able to determine the approximate profit 
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and loss for a product in market.In the year 2011, the 
paper[9] proposed by lin gao, xinbing wang and 
youyunxu, in the paper “Multiauctioneer Progressive 
Auction for Dynamic Spectrum Access”, they suggest 
the problem of residual channel allocation We propose 
an auction-based mechanism MAP, in which each PO 
systematically raises the trading prices and each SU 
subsequently decides whether to buy a spectrum band 
and from which PO he is going to buy a spectrum band. 
In the year 2011, the paper proposed by 
Andrew Chang, in the paper[8] “Time dynamics of user 
behavior in a series of overlapping electronic 
mechanism” they suggest shed new lights on time 
dynamics of online user behavior in the market which 
comprise a series of multiple overlapping auctions, the 
error can be occur during the series of electronic 
equipments there might be a loss of data and loss of 
important database. 
In the year 2011, the paper proposed by R. J. 
Thomas, T. D. Mount, R. Zimmerman, W. D. Schulze, in 
the paper[11] “Testing the Effects of Price Responsive 
Demand on Uniform Price and Soft-Cap Electricity 
Auctions”, they suggest that the effectiveness of a price 
while bidding in a market, the price can be low or high 
during auction mechanism. The drawback of this paper 
is the user can know about variations of prices in a 
market. But one problem occurs during researching of 
this paper that the user not able to extra features or 
more items. 
In the year 2011, the paper proposed by 
Shabnam Sodagari, Alireza Attar, in the paper “On a 
Truthful Mechanism for Expiring Spectrum Sharing in 
Cognitive Radio Networks” they suggest a powerful tool 
to realize such subletting of Spectrum is auction 
mechanisms. In this paper, we proposed a dynamic, 
online auction for secondary spectrum access, the 
drawback of this paper is proposed auction structure, 
secondary CRs not only will submit their valuation of 
auctioned spectrum band, but also their arrival and 
departure time instances. 
Computerized reservation systems were 
developed in the 1950s to keep track of airline seat 
booking and fare information. Initially these were internal 
systems, but were soon made available to travel agents. 
Deregulation of airline pricing in 1978 permitted much 
more extensive use of the systems for economic 
activity[12], especially pricing. The initial development of 
dynamically adjusted pricing is often credited to 
American Airlines‟ Robert Crandall, as a response to the 
rise of discount airline People‟s express in the early 
1980s. 
a) Problem Formulation  
The complexity and opaqueness of airline 
pricing has grown over time. As a result, the “yield 
management”[12]systems employed by airlines for 
pricing have become one of the most arcane and 
complex information systems on the planet, and one 
with a very large economic component. Airline pricing 
represents a great challenge for modern economic 
analysis because it is so distant from the “law of one 
price” level of analysis. This surveys the theoretical 
literature, which is mostly found in operations research 
journals, develops some new theory, assesses the holes 
in our knowledge, and describes some results from a 
new database of airline prices. Dynamic pricing, which 
is also known as yield management or revenue 
management, is a set of pricing strategies aimed at 
increasing profits. The techniques are most useful when 
two product characteristics co-exist. First, the product 
expires at a point in time, like hotel rooms, airline flights, 
generated electricity, or time-dated (“sell before”) 
products. Second, capacity is fixed well in advance and 
can be augmented only at a relatively high marginal 
cost. These characteristics create the potential for very 
large swings in the opportunity cost of sale, because the 
opportunity cost of sale is a potential foregone 
subsequent sale. The value of a unit in a shortage 
situation is the highest value of an unserved customer. 
Forecasting this value given current sales and available 
capacity represents dynamic pricing. 
III. EMPIRICAL SOLUTION 
The dynamic pricing in auction mechanism 
involve some existing sytems like e-bay auction 
technology site and multi-agent wireless system for 
dynamic and local combined pricing, allocation and 
billing. The e-bay is an world‟s largest auction site where 
this site shows the interaction between the seller and 
buyer-bay is one of the profitable e-business site, on e-
bay people can buy and sell just about anything, the 
company collects a submission see upfront and a 
commission as a percentage of the sale amount. 
Example1: The auction process in e-bay: The 
seller fills in the appropriate registration information post 
the description of the item for sale specifying a minimum 
opening bid, if a successful bid is made ,the seller and 
the buyer negotiate the payment method, shipping 
details, warranty and  other  perticulers,e-bay is the 
interface through which sellers and buyers can conduct 
business. In 2011 e-bay started to auction fine art in 
collaboration with icollector.com of the united kingdom 
and sothebys.com, e-bay operates globally buyers from 
more than 150 other countries participate, trading can 
be made from anywhere and at any time.  
Example
 
2
 
:
 
Multi-Agent Wireless System for 
Dynamic and Local Combined Pricing, Allocation and 
Billing:
 
In established communications systems with an 
underlying provider infrastructure the market is designed 
according to the Fixed Price Model (FPM). A user can 
get access to the network only if there are free 
resources controlled by the Base Station (BS) within a 
cell. Furthermore, he has to accept the ﬁxed price for 
© 2012 Global Journals Inc.  (US)
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awide area and quasi-static in time. The user has to pay 
the same price whether there is a high or a low 
demanding the cell. Thus, if his preferences and 
purchase power allow him to spend more money for 
using Radio Resource Goods (RRG), he is not able to 
inﬂuence the allocation. For the same reason the 
operator misses the chance to increase his monetary 
gain by adapting the price for RRG to the users RRG 
evaluation. To overcome these problems will 
introduce a distributed, dynamical and combined 
pricing, allocation and billing system, suitable for 
wireless infrastructure communications systems which 
are capable to manage multi-homing. By applying 
Cognitive Radio (CR) abilities not only to the allocation 
but also to this combined architecture, it is mandatory to 
dynamically allocate RRG by an Auction Sequence (AS) 
to exploit the CR abilities the repetition of auctions 
should happen very fast up to milliseconds to react on 
the load dynamic. A class of auctions, the multi-unit 
sealed-bid auction, is suitable to execute the auction 
within speciﬁed time and with an acceptable signalling 
effort in comparison to sequential auctions.The 
economical ﬁeld auction theory mainly deals with single 
shot auction, but not with auction repetition. The 
framework of the optimal multi-unit auction is proposed 
in, but does not deal with repetitions and does not 
include learning facilities of the UTs. Gaining experience 
of the past and applying it in the current auction destroy 
the independence of the single shot auctions.the 
asymmetric balance of negotiation power needs to be 
considered in auction design. The prices bid in a basic 
auction are dependent only on the bidder‟s willingness 
to pay. This means that intentions of only bidders, but 
not the auctioneer, are reflected in the auction winning 
prices. To restore the symmetric balance of negotiating 
power, the reservation price (RPA) and cancelable (CA) 
auctions were proposed. In RPA, only bids higher than 
the auctioneer‟s reservation price are considered during 
winner selection. On the other hand, in CA, if the 
resulting revenue of an auction round does not meet the 
minimum requirement of the auctioneer, the entire 
auction round is cancelled. By providing reservation 
price or cancellation option to the auctioneer, the 
asymmetric negotiation power problem is resolved. 
However, when the perishable resources are traded, 
both of these auctions cause resource waste. In RPA, 
the reservation price restricts the number of winners. 
Hence, the resources unused because of this restriction 
are wasted. In CA, the cancellation of an auction round 
wastes the entire stock of resources that are allocated to 
this auction round. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
1. It is very clear that advances in internet and 
e-commerce technologies have opened up rich 
opportunities for reaping the beneﬁts of dynamic pricing. 
Companies resorting to dynamic pricing strategies are 
increasing in number steadily. Moreover, increasingly 
complex dynamic pricing strategies are being tried out. 
In this paper, we have covered the following topics.
 
We have shown that the ﬁxed pricing paradigm 
is giving way to a dynamic pricing paradigm in e-
business markets and those dynamic pricing strategies: 
Conditions under which dynamic pricing strategies will 
outperform ﬁxed pricing strategies have been 
enunciated.
 
Searching for more efficient ways of deciding 
the auctioneer‟s optimal bid that defines the DW and PW 
classes. Seeking a better way to find the optimal winning 
score coefficient for the winner selection strategy. 
Attempting to identify more efficient and simpler pricing 
rules that preserve incentive compatibility but achieve 
higher auctioneer‟s revenue 
Software modelling of dynamic pricing 
mechanism which illustrates the reliability and efficiency 
of the proposed model. 
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V. FUTURE WORKS 
We can develop a pricing model for 
substitutable flights where customers choose among 
the available flights. To overcome computational 
problems posed by the formulation‟s multi-dimensional 
state and action spaces, we considered heuristics 
based on pooling ideas. We also derived easily-
computable separable bounds for the value function of 
our model. Policies motivated by these bounds were 
shown numerically to be near optimal for a range of 
problem instances, and to dominate the policies from 
pooling in most cases. Our results suggest that pooling 
heuristics perform well for symmetric problems in which 
(a) customers, when viewed as a population, are mostly 
indifferent in their preferences over flights and (b) the 
flights have the same seating capacity. However, the 
pooling heuristics can perform poorly for asymmetric 
problems. The approaches motivated by the separable 
bounds do not suffer from such shortcomings, and 
remain implementable for large problems. 
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